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LIST OF PARTIES 
1. Free Motion Fitness and Icon Health & Fitness. Free Motion and Icon 
(collectively "Icon" or the "Icon Parties") are the buyers under an Asset Purchase 
Agreement with Ground Zero Design, LLC as seller (the "Asset Purchase Agreement") 
and also a party to the Indemnity Escrow Agreement between Icon, Ground Zero and 
Wells Fargo. 
2. Ground Zero Design, LLC - Defendant/Appellee. Ground Zero is the 
seller under the Asset Purchase Agreement and also a party to the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement. 
3. Wells Fargo Bank West, N.A. - Defendant/Appellee. Wells Fargo is the 
escrow agent under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. 
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Wells Fargo Bank West, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), a defendant and appellee in the 
above-captioned case, submits this brief pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3-
(2)0) (2001). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
AND CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee, Wells Fargo, disputes Appellants' Statement of Issues numbered A, B, 
C, D, E, and F and asserts that each of those statements of issues is a repetitive statement 
of the following issue: 
Issue No. 1: 
Did the trial court err in finding that the Icon Parties' right to the Escrow Funds 
was governed by the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement and that under the terms of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, the August 2001 Certificate did not provide a basis to a 
claim to the Escrow Funds? 
Appellee, Wells Fargo additionally disputes Appellants' Statement of Issue 
numbered G and asserts that this issue is more correctly stated as follows: 
Issue No. 2: 
Did the trial court err in finding that the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and 
therefore could not be the basis for a claim to the Escrow Funds? 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The issues presented on appeal are governed by the contracts entered into by the 
parties and by the common law. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In December 2000, Free Motion Fitness and Icon Health & Fitness (collectively 
"Icon" or the "Icon Parties") purchased all of the assets of Ground Zero Design, LLC 
("Ground Zero") pursuant to a written Asset Purchase Agreement ("Asset Purchase 
Agreement"). In the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero made certain 
indemnification obligations in favor of Icon and $400,000 (the "Escrow Funds") of the 
purchase price was deposited in escrow with Wells Fargo Bank to partially satisfy 
indemnification obligations that may arise during the first year after the purchase under 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. In connection with the escrow, Icon, Ground Zero and 
Wells Fargo entered into an Indemnity Escrow Agreement (the "Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement"). 
Wells Fargo released these Escrow Funds to Ground Zero one year later in 
December 2001. Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds was premature under the 
terms of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. However, under the terms of the Indemnity 
Escrow Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement, these Escrow Funds would have 
ultimately been released to Ground Zero in any event. Therefore, the Icon Parties can 
claim no damages from the release of the Escrow Funds. 
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The Icon Parties sued Wells Fargo claiming entitlement to the Escrow Funds, and 
sued Ground Zero claiming an obligation to indemnify the Icon Parties. The Icon Parties 
alleged two claims to the Escrow Funds. Neither of the claims made by the Icon Parties 
entitles them to receive the Escrow Funds under the terms of the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement. In particular, the Icon Parties' first claim for indemnification from the 
Escrow Funds (the August 2001 Certificate) was based on an alleged breach of warranty 
by Ground Zero under the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The warranty made 
by Ground Zero on which the Icon Parties relied is a warranty that no patents sold by 
Ground Zero to the Icon Parties infringe on any other patents. Though Hoist Fitness 
asserted that patents held by the Icon Parties infringed a patent held by Hoist Fitness, the 
Icon Parties obtained a judgment from the United States District Court declaring that the 
Icon Parties' patents do not infringe on the Hoist Patent. Thus, this decree conclusively 
establishes that Ground Zero did not breach its warranty of non-infringement, the Icon 
Parties have no basis for a claim for indemnification, and the August 2001 Certificate did 
not represent a valid claim to the Escrow Funds. The trial court correctly so held, based 
on the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement and Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Now 
on appeal, the Icon Parties argue that general case law regarding warranties of title 
entitles them to indemnification. However, this new argument fails because it requires 
the Court to ignore the express terms of the written contracts which outline the sole bases 
for indemnification and claim to the Escrow Funds. 
Additionally, the Icon Parties' second claim for indemnification from the Escrow 
viii 
Funds (the July 2003 Certificate) was untimely under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. 
Under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement, the Escrow Funds were to be released to 
Ground Zero in December 2001 if there was no claim for indemnification. As of 
February 2003, when the Icon Parties obtained the judgment against Hoist Fitness, no 
basis existed for Wells Fargo to hold any Escrow Funds. Also, the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement expired by its terms in December 2001 when the Escrow Funds were 
disbursed. For both of those reasons, the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and 
ineffective under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. 
Because neither of the claims made by the Icon Parties was a valid claim to the 
Escrow Funds, the Icon Parties can claim no damages from the release of the Escrow 
Funds, even if Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds was premature, and the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo dismissing the Icon 
Parties5 claims. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court 
1. The Icon Parties filed this action on April 13, 2004. (R. 1-9.) 
2. Defendants Wells Fargo and Ground Zero separately answered the 
Complaint. Ground Zero asserted various cross-claims and counterclaims against Icon 
and Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo asserted cross-claims against Ground Zero for 
indemnification. (R. 76-89, 90-98, 122-132, 324-335.) 
3. On June 2, 2006, the Court held a hearing regarding various 
summary judgment motions filed by the parties. At that hearing, the Court granted Wells 
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Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment against Icon, and granted Ground Zero's Motion 
to Dismiss Wells Fargo's Claim for equitable subordination. (R. 2084-85, 2090-2092, 
2096-2102.) 
4. Pursuant to the ruling made at the June 2, 2006 hearing, the Court 
entered an Order dated October 31, 2006 regarding Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing all of Icon's claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. (R. 2090-
2092.) 
5. The Court entered an Order dated October 18, 2007 regarding 
Ground Zero's summary judgment motions, and dismissed with prejudice Icon's claims 
against Ground Zero and Wells Fargo's second and third causes of action against Ground 
Zero. (R. 2096-2102.) 
6. As a result of these Orders, all of Icon's claims against Wells Fargo 
and Ground Zero were dismissed by the trial court. (R. 2096-2102.) 
7. On December 3, 2007, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the 
Court entered an Order dismissing without prejudice Wells Fargo's remaining claims 
against Ground Zero. (R. 2106-2108.) 
8. On December 11, 2007, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the 
Court entered an Order dismissing without prejudice Ground Zero's remaining claims 
against Icon and Wells Fargo. (R. 2113-2117.) 
9. The Icon Parties filed a Notice of Appeal on January 2, 2008. (R. 
2118-2120.) 
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C. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issue Presented on Appeal. 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Icon Parties' claims, 
Wells Fargo submitted the following statement of undisputed material facts, with 
citations to the record, as required by Rules 7(c) and 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Asset Purchase Agreement 
1. On or about December 19, 2000, Plaintiff Free Motion Fitness Inc. (then 
known as Ground Zero Design Corporation) ("Free Motion") and Plaintiff Icon Health & 
Fitness ("Icon Health") (Free Motion and Icon Health are referred to collectively as 
"Icon" or the "Icon Parties"), as buyers, entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the 
"Asset Purchase Agreement") with Defendant Ground Zero Design, LLC ("Ground 
Zero"), as seller, whereby the Icon Parties would acquire Ground Zero's business. See 
Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Icon Parties' 
Brief of Appellant ("Br. of Appellant"); (R. 2, 743, 757-798) 
2. In the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero agreed to indemnify the 
Icon Parties up to an amount of $2.4 million during the one-year period following closing 
and up to the amount of $2 million for any claims made through August 31, 2004. (R. 2, 
743-757-798.) 
3. The scope of Ground Zero's promise to indemnify, as set out in § 10.2 of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, included any losses related to "[a]ny breach of the 
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representations and warranties made in Article 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement." 
(R. 2-3,743,790-791.) 
4. In Article 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero made 
representations and warranties, including a representation and warranty that: 
No Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any 
rights owned or held by any other Person. 
(R. 31,743-744,771.) 
Indemnity Escrow Agreement 
5. In connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Icon Parties and 
Ground Zero entered into an Indemnity Escrow Agreement with Wells Fargo as Escrow 
Agent (the "Indemnity Escrow Agreement"). Pursuant to the terms of the Indemnity 
Escrow Agreement, Wells Fargo was to hold $400,000.00 of the purchase price (the 
"Escrow Funds") for the purpose of partially satisfying indemnity claims made by the 
Icon Parties in connection with a breach of the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
for the one year period ending December 21, 2001. See Indemnity Escrow Agreement, a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Brief of Appellant. (R. 5, 62-71, 744, 800-
809.) 
The August 2001 Certificate 
6. By letters dated March 16, 2001, the Icon Parties and Ground Zero received 
notice that Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. and/or Randall P. Webber (collectively "Hoist 
Fitness") claimed that the Free Motion Cable Cross Device purchased by the Icon Parties 
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from Ground Zero infringed on a patent (the "Hoist Patent") owned by Hoist Fitness. 
(R. 744,812-815.) 
7. On or about August 14, 2001, the Icon Parties delivered to Wells Fargo and 
to Ground Zero a Buyer's Certificate (the "August 2001 Certificate") asserting a claim 
for indemnification in excess of $400,000.00 based upon the threatened claim made by 
Hoist Fitness. (R. 5-6, 744, 817-818.) 
8. In the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon Parties state that they are "entitled 
to indemnification under Article 10 of the Asset Purchase Agreement," under the 
following circumstances: 
(a) Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. and/or Randall T. Webber, 
in a letter to Mr. Roy Simonson dated March 16, 2001, have made a 
claim that the Icon cable cross device, sold by Seller to Buyer, 
infringes on the Webber/Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. patent U.S. 
Patent No. 5,800,321. This officer's certificate provides formal 
notice to Seller and Escrow Agent of such claim of infringement and 
invokes the remedies set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement 
("Asset Purchase Agreement") by and among Seller, Buyer, and 
Icon dated as of December 19, 2000, and the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement executed simultaneously therewith. Buyer and Icon have 
engaged the firm of Workman, Nydegger & Seeley to represent them 
in such proceedings. A complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement and of patent invalidity has been filed by Buyer in 
the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, 
Civil Action No. 1:01CV0091C. 
(b) Pursuant to Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, the Seller represented that "no Intellectual Property . . . 
infringes upon any rights owned or held by any other Person." In 
the event that the Hoist claim of infringement is successfully 
prosecuted^ such will render the foregoing Seller representation to 
be inaccurate and will subject Seller to the indemnification 
obligation of up to $2,400,000 set forth in paragraph 10.2 of the 
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Asset Purchase Agreement. Such indemnification obligation 
includes any Losses which the Buyer Parties may suffer and, as 
defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement, includes attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred in defending against any such claim. 
See August 2001 Certificate, a copy of which is included in Exhibit 3 to the Brief of 
Appellant; (R. 745,817-818.) 
The Icon Parties' Declaratory Judgment Action 
9. In response to the letter from Hoist Fitness, the Icon Parties filed a 
declaratory judgment action against Hoist in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah (the "Icon Declaratory Judgment Action"). (R. 4, 745, 820-825.) 
10. In the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action, the Icon Parties stated two claims 
for relief: (1) a first claim for relief seeking a declaration that the Icon products purchased 
from Ground Zero do not infringe any claim of the Hoist Patent; and (2) a second claim 
for relief seeking a declaration that the Hoist Patent is invalid. (R. 746, 820-825.) 
11. In response, Hoist filed a counterclaim asserting that the Icon products 
infringed the Hoist Patent. (R. 746, 827-843.) 
12. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment in the Icon Declaratory 
Judgment Action, the Court entered Orders on January 23, 2003 and February 10, 2003 
granting the Icon Parties summary judgment on their first claim for relief and declaring 
that the Icon products do not infringe on the Hoist Patent. (R. 746, 845-848, 849-852.) 
13. As a result of the Court's ruling, the Icon Parties then voluntarily dismissed 
their second claim for relief in the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action, and on April 11, 
2003, the case was closed. (R. 746, 854-856, 858-876.) 
Termination of Escrow and Release of Funds 
14. Under the terms of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement, Wells Fargo was to 
release the Escrow Funds to Ground Zero on December 20, 2001, unless by that date it 
had received notice from the Icon Parties of an indemnity claim. (R. 5, 747, 800-810.) 
15. The Indemnity Escrow Agreement provides that the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement terminates when (a) there are no funds remaining in the Escrow Fund; or 
(b) by mutual consent of the parties. (R. 5, 747, 803.) 
16. In December 2001, Wells Fargo released the entire Escrow Fund to Ground 
Zero. (R. 6, 747.) 
The July 2003 Certificate 
17. After the release of the Escrow Fund and after the Icon Declaratory 
Judgment Action was closed, on or about May 5, 2003, Michael A. Grassmueck, as the 
receiver for Znetix, Inc., brought an action against the Icon Parties and Ground Zero 
seeking to recover approximately $1.3 million advanced to Ground Zero prior to the 
Asset Purchase Agreement (the "Znetix Advance"). (R. 4, 747.) 
18. By officer's certificate dated July 16, 2003 (the "July 2003 Certificate"), 
the Icon Parties gave notice to Wells Fargo and Ground Zero of a second claim for 
indemnification pursuant to the Indemnity Escrow Agreement and the Asset Purchase 
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Agreement based upon claims asserted against the Icon Parties because of the Znetix 
Advance. See July 2003 Certificate, a copy of which is included in Exhibit 3 to the Brief 
of Appellant. (R. 6, 747, 878-879.) 
In response to Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, the Icon Parties 
purported to "partially dispute" material facts numbered 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17 and 18 
stated in Wells Fargo's memorandum and restated above. However, in each case, the 
Icon Parties' purported dispute of these facts was merely a statement that a dispute exists 
concerning the legal effect of the stated fact. For example, Wells Fargo's statement of 
fact number 8 quotes the August 2001 Certificate in which the Icon Parties claim 
entitlement to indemnification based on a potential breach of Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement. The Icon Parties purported to "partially dispute" this fact "to 
the extent Wells Fargo purports that the Icon Parties are limited to the grounds for 
indemnification set out in the August 2001 Officer's Certificate." (R. 916.) Thus, the 
Icon Parties did not contest the August 2001 Certificate or the contents of that certificate, 
only the legal effect of that certificate. Each of the other "partial disputes" is similar. In 
fact, Wells Fargo's material facts numbered 1, 5, 16, 17 and 18 were taken from, and are 
nearly identical to, paragraphs 7, 20, 27, 17 and 28 of the Icon Parties' Complaint. None 
of the Icon Parties' purported "partial disputes" of fact was effective to create an issue of 
material fact. 
The additional facts cited by the Icon Parties go to whether Wells Fargo breached 
duties owed to the Icon Parties and whether that breach constitutes gross negligence. 
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Those facts and issues were not material to the issue of whether the Icon Parties suffered 
any damages as a result of Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds, which was the 
issue raised in Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment. Under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 7(c) and 56(c), the Icon Parties' failure to dispute the facts prevents the Icon 
Parties from nowr relying on appeal on additional facts not presented to the trial court. 
See Rule 7(C)(3)(a) ("Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party."). The Icon Parties' Statement of the Case in their Appellants' Brief contains facts 
not properly presented to the trial court in response to Wells Fargo's summary judgment 
motion, and therefore not properly argued on appeal. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing the Icon Parties' claims against Wells Fargo. The August 2001 Certificate 
was not a valid claim for indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement and the 
Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Rather, as acknowledged in the August 2001 Certificate, 
an indemnifiable claim would have arisen only if there were an actual patent 
infringement, i.e., an actual breach of warranty, and the federal court determined that 
there was no such infringement. Therefore, the Icon Parties can claim no damages from 
Wells Fargo's premature release of the Escrow Funds. 
On appeal, the Icon Parties ask this Court to ignore the terms of the written 
agreements, and adopt broad warranty of title requirements as the basis for the Icon 
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Parties5 indemnification. However, the bases for the Icon Parties' indemnification, and 
their claim to the Escrow Funds, are explicitly stated in the Asset Purchase Agreement 
and the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Had the parties desired to expand those bases to 
include claims of patent infringement, instead of actual patent infringement, they would 
have stated that in the written agreements. 
Additionally, because the Icon Parties' July 2003 Certificate was untimely, it did 
not create a valid claim for indemnification. 
For these reasons, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ICON COULD CLAIM 
NO DAMAGES CAUSED BY WELLS FARGO'S RELEASE OF THE 
ESCROW FUNDS. 
A. The August 2001 Certificate Was Not a Valid Claim to the Escrow Funds 
Because There Was No Patent Infringement and Thus No Breach of 
Warranty by Ground Zero. 
The trial court correctly held that the Icon Parties have no claim to the Escrow 
Funds in connection with the August 2001 Certificate because that certificate was not a 
valid claim for indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Specifically, under 
these facts, for a claim to be indemnifiable under the Asset Purchase Agreement, there 
must be an actual breach of warranty, i.e., patent infringement, which did not occur in 
this case. This actual breach requirement is made clear both by the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and the Icon Parties' own Buyer's Certificate, and each is addressed in turn. 
1. The Indemnity Escrow Agreement is Governed by the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. 
To claim any right to the Escrow Funds, the Icon Parties must establish that they 
had a right to indemnification from Ground Zero under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
The Escrow Fund was established "to pay indemnification claims" of the Icon Parties 
"pursuant to Article 10 of the Purchase Agreement" and the Indemnity Escrow 
Agreement specifically states that "ftjhe basis for claims to indemnification, and any 
limitations thereon, shall be governed by the Purchase Agreement, which shall be 
controlling between Buyer and Seller for all purposes of this Escrow Agreement. . ." 
1 
(R. 62-63.)1 
2. The Asset Purchase Agreement Required Actual Infringement For A 
Breach Of Warranty. 
To establish a right to indemnification under Section 10.2(a)(i) and (ii) of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement, there must have been an actual breach of warranty—not 
1
 The Asset Purchase Agreement contains a list of six specific events giving rise to an 
obligation of Ground Zero to indemnify the Icon Parties. The relevant portions are as 
follows: 
Section 10.2 Indemnification of Buyer by Seller 
(a) Obligation. Seller agrees to indemnify the Buyer and 
each of its officers, directors, stockholders, employees, agents, members, 
representatives, affiliates, successors and assigns (collectively, the "Buyer 
Parties") and hold each of them harmless from and against and pay on 
behalf of or reimburse such Buyer Parties in respect of the entirety of any 
Losses which the Buyer Parties may suffer, sustain or become subject to, up 
to a cumulative maximum amount of $2,400,000 (during the one-year 
period following Closing) and thereafter up to a cumulative maximum 
amount of $2,000,000, as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in 
connection with: 
(i) subject to Section 10.2(b) below, the breach of 
any representation or warranty made by the Seller in Article 3 of this 
Agreement or in any certificate delivered with respect thereto by the Seller; 
(ii) the breach of any representation, warranty 
(other than representations or warranties set forth in Articles 3), covenant or 
agreement made by the Seller contained in this Agreement or any of the 
other agreements contemplated hereby, any Exhibit or Schedule hereto or 
thereto or any certificate delivered by Seller to the Buyer with respect 
thereto; 
(R. 52-53.) 
2 
merely a claimed or threatened breach. Ground Zero's obligation, if any, to indemnify 
the Icon Parties in relation to the representation made in Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement is stated in Section 10.2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement in which 
Ground Zero agreed to indemnify the Icon Parties for losses "as a result of, arising out of, 
relating to or in connection with . . . the breach of any representation or warranty made 
by the Seller in Article 3 of this Agreement or in any certificate delivered with respect 
thereto by the Seller." (R. 52-53.) In relation to patents, Ground Zero's warranty was 
that "[n]o Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any rights owned or held by any other 
Parties." (R. 31.) Ground Zero plainly did not warrant that other parties will not claim 
infringement, nor did Ground Zero agree to pay costs incurred by the Icon Parties for 
claims or threatened claims of infringement. See e.g., Mermelstein v. Menora, 865 
N.E.2d 239, 248 (111. Ct. App. 2007) (clause provided that partnership shall indemnify 
2
 The Icon Parties contend that "[a]n indemnitee's right to recover fees and costs incurred 
in defense is not contingent upon whether the claim indemnified against is ultimately 
successful." (Br. of Appellant at 20). However, this argument fails because it ignores the 
plain language of the Asset Purchase Agreement which expressly requires a "breach," not 
merely a "claimed" or "threatened" breach. See Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 688 A.2d 1088, 
1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) ("Indemnity contracts are interpreted in accordance with the 
rules governing the construction of contracts generally. . . ."); May Dept. Stores Co. v. 
University Hills, Inc., 824 P.2d 100, 101 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[t]he extent of a 
contractual duty to indemnify must be determined from the contract itself. . . . it should 
be enforced according to the plain and generally accepted meaning of its language and 
interpreted in its entirety to give effect to all of its provisions so none are rendered 
meaningless.") (citations omitted). See also id. (ruling that indemnity exclusion clause 
applied only where there was actual negligence on the part of May Company, and 
finding trial court erred in ruling that the "meritorious nature of a claim is irrelevant to 
invocation of the exclusion clause.") (emphasis added). 
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and hold harmless for "any judgment, award, settlement, reasonable attorneys' fees and 
other costs or expenses incurred "in connection with the defense of any actual or 
threatened action, proceeding or claim . . . .") (emphasis added); Bates Fabrics, Inc. v. 
LeVeen, 590 A.2d 528, 531 (Me. 1991) (clause in bylaws provided for indemnification 
for "[a]ny person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any 
threatened, pending, or completed action . . . . " ) (emphasis added). Further, Ground Zero 
did not agree to indemnify if the Icon Parties sought a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement. Ground Zero's warranty simply was that the patents did not infringe on 
other patents. 
3. The Icon Parties' August 2001 Buyer's Certificate Was Based On 
An Alleged Breach Of The Warranty Of Non-Infringement And 
Acknowledged That Actual Infringement Was Required. 
The Icon Parties' August 2001 Buyer's Certificate was based on an alleged breach 
of the warranty of non-infringement and acknowledged that indemnification required an 
actual breach of warranty. This language of this certificate is contrary to the 
interpretation now urged by the Icon Parties. 
As noted above, under the terms of the agreements between the parties, the Icon 
Parties' right to claim indemnification from the Escrow Funds arose only if there is a 
"breach of any representation or warranty." The relevant warranty relied on by the Icon 
Parties was Ground Zero's warranty that no patent sold by Ground Zero to the Icon 
Parties infringed on any other patents. Ground Zero did not warrant that other parties 
will not claim infringement, nor did Ground Zero agree to pay costs incurred by the Icon 
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Parties if they sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. Ground Zero's 
warranty simply was the patents did not infringe on other patents. 
In the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon Parties claimed entitlement to 
indemnification because of an alleged breach of Article 3.10(c)(ii), in which Ground Zero 
warranted that "[n]o Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any rights owned or held by 
any other Person." (R. 31.) The Icon Parties allege that this warranty was breached 
when Hoist Fitness claimed, by letter, that Ground Zero patents infringed the Hoist 
Patent. (R. 817-818.) However, in submitting the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon 
Parties acknowledged that under the Asset Purchase Agreement, their claim to 
indemnification from the Escrow Funds existed only if there was actual infringement of 
the Hoist Patent, stating: "[i]n the event that the Hoist claim of infringement is 
successfully prosecuted, such will render the foregoing Seller representation to be 
inaccurate and will subject Seller to the indemnification obligation of up to $2,400,000 
set forth in paragraph 10.2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement." (R. 817-818) (emphasis 
added). Based on this language, the trial court correctly observed that the "certificate 
stated a conditional claim based on successful prosecution." (R. 2127 (Tr. at 64:15-16).) 
Based on the Icon Parties5 own Buyer's Certificate, the Icon Parties cannot now contend 
that successful prosecution by Hoist, i.e., an actual breach, was not required for 
indemnification. 
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4. The Judgment in the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action Established 
That Ground Zero Did Not Breach Any Warranty In Connection 
With the Hoist Patent. 
The judgment obtained by the Icon Parties in the Icon Declaratory Judgment 
Action established as a matter of law that Ground Zero did not breach any warranty in 
relation to the Hoist Patent, conclusively establishing that there was therefore no 
indemnifiable claim. 
In the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action filed against Hoist Fitness, the Icon 
Parties sought a declaration that the Ground Zero patents held by the Icon Parties did not 
infringe on the Hoist Patent (First Claim for Relief) or alternatively, that the Hoist Patent 
is invalid (Second Claim for Relief). (R. 820-825.) Hoist counterclaimed alleging that 
the Ground Zero patents held by the Icon Parties infringe on the Hoist Patent. (R. 827-
843.) 
In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Icon Parties on their First Claim for 
Relief and denied Hoist's cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim and 
found that "the accused devises of the Free Motion Old Design do not infringe claim 1 
(or any claim depending thereform [sic] of the [Hoist] patent) literally or under the 
doctrine of equivalents." (R. 845-848, 849-852.) 
The federal court order conclusively established that the Ground Zero patents did 
not infringe the Hoist Patent. Therefore, that order also conclusively established that 
Ground Zero did not breach its warranty of non-infringement as to the Hoist Patent. 
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Thus, the August 2001 Certificate, which was based on an alleged breach of warranty in 
relation to the Hoist Patent, did not state any valid claim to indemnification from the 
Escrow Funds. 
B. The Icon Parties Cannot Establish Any Damages. 
Because the August 2001 Certificate did not represent a valid claim for 
indemnification from the Escrow Fund, the Icon Parties cannot show any damages arising 
from the allegedly premature release of the Escrow Funds. With no valid claim for 
indemnification, Ground Zero would have been entitled to the Escrow Funds as of 
December 21, 2001 and no damage to the Icon Parties arose as a result of the allegedly 
premature release of the funds on that date. See Colo. Nat'l. Bank v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 
159, 174 (Colo. 1993) ("Generally c[d]amages in contract cases attempt to place the 
parties in the same financial position they would have occupied had the contract terms 
been fulfilled.' Where claims for damages are premised on breaches of contracts, 
c[d]amages that are merely speculative, remote, imaginary or impossible of 
ascertainment, cannot be recovered/") {quoting Republic Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v. Red Lion 
Homes, 704 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1983) and Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125, 130, 454 
P.2d 156, 158 (1927) and Lee v. Durango Music, 144 Colo. 270, 278, 355 P.2d 1083, 
1087(1960).) 
Because Ground Zero was entitled to the Escrow Funds absent a timely, valid 
claim for indemnification, any damages claimed by the Icon Parties from the release of 
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the Escrow Funds to Ground Zero are merely imaginary. The Icon Parties are now in the 
same position they would have occupied had the funds been timely released. 
C. The Icon Parties Cannot Expand The Bases For Indemnification Beyond 
That Stated In The Written Agreements. 
The Icon Parties make several additional arguments. However, these arguments 
fail because they do not acknowledge the plain language of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. 
1. The Icon Parties' Reliance on the "Defense of Claims" Paragraph 
Fails. 
The Icon Parties' reliance on the "Defense of Claims" paragraph in the Asset 
Purchase Agreement fails because the Defense of Claims paragraph does not expand the 
scope of indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Rather, the Icon Parties' 
selective excerpts from Section 10.4, "Defense of Claims" is not quoted in full and 
therefore is not a correct reading of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Section 10.4 states in 
full: 
Section 10.4 Defense of Claims 
If a party hereto seeks indemnification under this Article 10, such 
party (the "Indemnified Party") shall give written notice to the other party 
(the "Indemnifying Party") after receiving written notice of any action, 
lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or other claim against it (if by a third 
party) or discovering the liability, obligation or facts giving rise to such 
claim for indemnification, describing the claim, the amount thereof (if 
known and quantifiable), and the basis thereof; provided that the failure to 
so notify the Indemnifying Party shall not relieve the Indemnifying Party of 
its or his obligations hereunder except to the extent such failure shall have 
prejudiced the Indemnifying Party. In that regard, if any action, lawsuit, 
proceeding, investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any 
8 
third party which, if adversely determined, would entitle the Indemnified 
Party to indemnity pursuant to this Article 10, the Indemnified Party shall 
promptly notify the Indemnifying Party of the same in writing, specifying 
in detail the basis of such claim and the facts pertaining thereto and the 
Indemnifying Party shall be entitled to participate in the defense of such 
action, lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or other claim giving rise to the 
Indemnified Party's claim for indemnification at its expense, and at its 
option (subject to the limitations set forth below) shall be entitled to appoint 
lead counsel of such defense with reputable counsel reasonably acceptable 
to the Indemnified Party; provided that, as a condition precedent to the 
Indemnifying Party's right to assume control of such defense, it must first: 
(a) enter into an agreement with the Indemnified Party (in 
form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Indemnified Party) 
pursuant to which the Indemnifying Party agrees to be fully responsible for 
all Losses relating to such claims and that it will provide full 
indemnification to the Indemnified Party for all Losses relating to such 
claim; and 
(b) furnish the Indemnified Party with reasonable 
evidence lhat the Indemnifying Party is and will be able to satisfy any such 
liability; and, provided, further, that the Indemnifying Party shall not have 
the right to assume control of such defense and shall pay the fees and 
expenses of counsel retained by the Indemnified Party, if the claim which 
the Indemnifying Party seeks to assume control (i) seeks non-monetary 
relief, (ii) involves criminal or quasi-criminal allegations, (iii) involves a 
claim to which the Indemnified Party reasonably believes an adverse 
determination would be detrimental to or injure the Indemnified Party's 
reputation or future business prospects, or (iv) involves a claim which, 
upon petition by the Indemnified Party, the appropriate court rules that the 
Indemnifying Party failed or is failing to vigorously prosecute or defend. 
If the Indemnifying Party is permitted to assume and control the 
defense and elects to do so, the Indemnified Party shall have the right to 
employ counsel separate from counsel employed by the Indemnifying Party 
in any such action and to participate in the defense thereof, but the fees and 
expenses of such counsel employed by the Indemnified Party shall be at the 
expense of the Indemnified Party unless (i) the employment thereof has 
been specifically authorized by the Indemnifying Party in writing, or (ii) the 
Indemnified Party has been advised by legal counsel that a reasonable 
likelihood exists of a conflict of interest between the Indemnifying Party 
and the Indemnified Party. 
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If the Indemnifying Party shall control the defense of any such 
claim, the Indemnifying Party shall obtain the prior written consent of the 
Indemnified Party (which shall not be unreasonably withheld) before 
entering into any settlement of a claim or ceasing to defend such claim, if 
(i) pursuant to or as a result of such settlement or cessation, injunction or 
other equitable relief will be imposed against the Indemnified Party, (ii) if 
such settlement does not expressly unconditionally release the Indemnified 
Party from all liabilities and obligations with respect to such claim, without 
prejudice or (iii) such settlement would have an adverse impact on the 
liability of the Seller for Taxes for any taxable period (or portion thereof) 
beginning after the Closing Date. 
(R. 54-55 (emphasis added).) 
The Icon Parties' argument requires the Court to interpret Section 10.4 of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement as requiring the Indemnifying Party to defend claims. In fact, 
Section 10.4 does not so require. Rather, Section 10.4 merely gives to the Indemnifying 
Party the right, but not the obligation, to defend claims that may lead to a future 
obligation to indemnify. Section 10.4 provides that "[i]f a party hereto seeks 
indemnification under Article 10, such party (the "Indemnified Party") shall give written 
notice to the other party (the "Indemnifying Par ty") . . . " (R. 54-55.) The Asset 
Purchase Agreement then states: "In that regard, if any action, lawsuit, proceeding, 
investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any third party which, / / 
adversely determined, would entitle the Indemnified Party to indemnity pursuant to 
Article 10, ... the Indemnifying Party shall be entitled to participate in the defense of 
such action, lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or claim ... at its expense, and at its option 
(subject to the limitations set forth below) shall be entitled to appoint lead counsel of 
such defense ..." {See id.) (emphasis added). Thus, the Indemnifying Party is given the 
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right, but not the obligation to defend claims that "if adversely determined" would create 
an indemnification obligation. This is consistent with the August 2001 Certificate 
submitted by the Icon Parties, in which the Icon Parties expressly acknowledged that the 
Hoist threatened claim would give rise to a claim for indemnification only if Hoist 
established that there was infringement. 
This right to assume control of the defense is also expressly conditioned on the 
Indemnifying Party agreeing in writing that it will indeed indemnify the other party for 
all Losses that arise from the claim. {Id.) 
The portion of Section 10.4 quoted by the Icon Parties denies the Indemnifying 
Party the right to assume the defense of claims in certain circumstances, but does not 
create new obligations to indemnify. Specifically, the portion quoted by the Icon Parties 
states that "the Indemnifying party shall not have the right to assume control of such 
defense and shall pay the fees and expenses of counsel retained by the Indemnified Party, 
if the claim which the Indemnifying Party seeks to assume control" falls into one of the 
four categories thereafter described. (Id.) 
Thus, the clear reading of the Asset Purchase Agreement as a whole is that Section 
10.4 grants to Ground Zero a right, but not an obligation, to defend at its expense claims 
that may, if adversely determined, create an obligation to indemnify. In the defined cases 
in which the right to defend is not given to the Indemnifying Party, the Asset Purchase 
Agreement merely recognized that the Indemnifying Party will pay the attorneys' fees 
incurred by the Indemnified Party, but that obligation can only arise if the claim results in 
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an indemnifiable event under the agreement. To read the Asset Purchase Agreement 
otherwise is to create, out of a single clause, an obligation to pay attorneys' fees for 
defense of claims that do not amount to an indemnifiable event under Section 10.2 and 
which is inconsistent with the precise allocation of obligations under both Sections 10.2 
and 10.4 of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Had the parties agreed that Ground Zero 
would be liable for attorneys' fees for defense of a claimed infringement, Section 
10.3(a)(ii) of the Asset Purchase Agreement would state that an obligation to indemnify 
arises out of a claimed breach of any representation in Article 3. However, Section 
10.3(a)(ii) states that an obligation to indemnify arises out of an actual "breach of any 
representation or warranty made by Seller in Article 3." (R. 52-53.) 
2. "Losses" Are Indemnifiable Only if There Was a Breach of 
Warranty. 
The Icon Parties' reference to the broad definition of "Losses" in the Asset 
Purchase Agreement is also unavailing. "Losses" are recoverable only if they are "a 
result of, arising out of, or in connection with [ ] . . . the breach of any representation or 
warranty."4 (R. 52-53.) As explained above, Ground Zero's warranty in relation to 
3
 The Icon Parties focus on the language "as a result of, arising out of, or relating to or in 
connection with . . . . " to argue that such phrases should be interpreted broadly (Br. of 
Appellant at 30.) However, in so doing, the Icon Parties ignore the critical subsequent 
language which specifically requires a "breach." 
4
 The Icon Parties argue that "a breach of the warranty occurs whenever an adverse claim 
arises, without regard to whether the claim ultimately is successful." (Br. of Appellant at 
22.) However, the warranty of title cases relied on by the Icon Parties are not helpful 
because only one of the cases relied on involved a written agreement to indemnify. In 
Catlin Aviation Co. v. Equilease Corp., 626 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1981), cited by the Icon 
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patents, and relied on by the Icon Parties in making claim to the Escrow Funds (that the 
Intellectual Property does not infringe others' rights), was not breached - as evidenced by 
the Judgment in the Declaratory Judgment Action.5 (R. 750-752.) 
3. Other Provisions Of The Asset Purchase Agreement Demonstrate 
That There Is A Distinction Between A "Breach" And A "Claim." 
Moreover, the Icon Parties' argument that the indemnity clause somehow covered 
a "claim" of breach, rather than only an actual breach, is defeated by reference to other 
provisions of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Asset Purchase Agreement clearly 
delineates between an actual breach and a claim, because it uses both terms in the same 
section. Specifically, while Sections 10.2(a)(i) and (ii) use the term "breach," Section 
10.2(a)(iii) uses the term "claims," providing indemnification for "any claims of any 
brokers or finders claiming by, through or under the Seller with respect to the 
Parties, the seller of an airplane agreed in writing "to hold you harmless to any claims in 
the event any suit is instituted with respect to any claim which will challenge the legality 
of our title . . ." Id. at 858. Thus, in Catlin the seller expressly agreed to hold the buyer 
harmless if a suit was instituted challenging title. By contrast, the detailed, sophisticated 
agreement entered into by the Icon Parties and Ground Zero merely provided that Ground 
Zero indemnified if there is a breach of the warranty of non-infringement. Had the 
parties intended, the Icon Parties could easily have required the agreement to provide that 
Ground Zero will indemnify if a suit is instituted alleging an infringement. The Asset 
Purchase Agreement does not so provide. 
5
 The Icon Parties cite Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) for the 
proposition that "[u]nder Utah law, attorneys' fees are recoverable where 'the defendant's 
breach of contract foreseeably caused the plaintiff to incur attorney fees through 
litigation with a third party.'" (Br. of Appellant at 22-23) (emphasis added). However, 
Collier is not instructive because in the present case, there was no breach of contract by 
Wells Fargo that caused the Icon Parties to incur fees by initiating a declaratory judgment 
action against Hoist. 
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transactions contemplated hereby." (R. 52-53) (emphasis added). By using the terms 
"breach" and "claims" in the same section, but in different contexts, the Asset Purchase 
Agreement clearly contemplates a difference between an actual and a mere claimed 
breach. See Mitchell v. Prime Commercial, Inc., 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 269 *4 (Dec. 
30, 1999) (noting "[t]he fact that different language was used in the two paragraphs [of 
the same contract] underscores the argument that the paragraphs were likely intended to 
have different meanings.") 
4. Section 10.2fiv) Does Not Apply. 
Additionally, the Icon Parties cite Section 10.2(a)(iv) for the proposition that 
indemnification is required for "any facts, events, circumstances, conditions or status 
arising or existing prior to the Closing . . . and relating to the Seller." (Br. of Appellant at 
37.) However, this argument fails because of the well-established rule of construction 
that a specific provision, i.e., Section 10.2(a)(i) and (ii), which deal specifically with 
breach of warranty, governs over a general provision, i.e., Section 10.2(a)(iv), which 
generally refers to "facts, events, circumstances, conditions or status . . . ." The specific 
warranty relied on by Icon in relation to patents is a warranty by Ground Zero that no 
intellectual property infringes on rights of others. (R. 31.) This specific warranty as to 
intellectual property, which was not breached, controls over more general warranties. 
See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 812 (Utah 2000) ("[i]t is not this court's practice 
to override specific language with general provisions dealing with wholly distinct subject 
matter. Under the well-established rule of construction ejusdem generis, general 
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language must be confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which proceeds [sic] 
it, unless a contrary intention is shown.") Thus, the Icon Parties cannot ignore the 
specific language of Section 10.2(a)(i) and rely on the catch-all language of Section 
10.2(a)(iv). 
5. The Icon Parties' Cases Are Distinguishable Because They Apply 
Only To Indemnifiable Claims, And The Present Claim Is Not 
Indemnifiable. 
The Icon Parties cite several other cases to support their position. However, 
reliance on these cases is misplaced because, unlike the present case, the Icon Parties' 
cases involve recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred only in defending an 
indemnified claim. (Br. of Appellant at 19-21.) As explained above, because the Icon 
Parties' claim is not an "indemnified claim," the cases are not instructive. 
For example, the Icon Parties rely heavily on the case of Peter Fabrics v. S.S. 
"Hermes, " 765 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir. 1985). However, this case is not helpful to the Icon 
Parties because in Peter Fabrics, the Court found only that "an indemnitee may recover 
from his indemnitor attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defending a claim as to 
which he is indemnified . . . ." Id. at 315 (emphasis added). Because the present claim is 
not one "as to which [the Icon Parties are] indemnified," Peter Fabrics is inapplicable.6 
6
 In Peter Fabrics, the indemnification clause specifically permitted indemnification for 
mere claims, stating that "[Italian Line] will defend, indemnify and hold harmless 
[Massport] from and against all claims, causes of action, suits, losses, damages, liabilities 
and expenses . . . ." 765 F.2d at 313. Similarly, in Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., Inc., 527 
P.2d 1115, 1118 (Wash. 1974), the indemnification clause specifically covered "claims." 
By contrast, in the present case, the indemnification language is markedly different, 
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Other cases cited by the Icon Parties are inapplicable for the same reasons. See 
Piedmont Equip. Co. v. Eberhard Manufacturing Co., 665 P.2d 256, 258 (Nev. 1983) 
(discussing attorneys' fees and costs relating to situations in which a party was 
"otherwise entitled to indemnity") (emphasis added); Duty Free Shoppers Group, Ltd. v. 
State, 111 P.2d 649, 654(Alaska 1989) (affirming award of costs and attorney's fees in 
case where state was entitled to indemnity). 
Moreover, the case of Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975), {see 
Br. of Appellant at 19-20), does not support the Icon Parties' argument because in that 
case, the Court actually found that "the predicate for indemnity [was] breach of the 
implied warranty of workmanlike service," 528 F.2d at 245 (emphasis added), not a mere 
claim of a breach that ultimately proved unsuccessful, and in Flunker, the court found 
that the relevant warranty was, in fact, breached. 
The Icon Parties also cite the Utah cases of James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp, 888 P.2d 665, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1974) and Pavoni v. Nielsen, 999 P.2d 595 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000), for the proposition that "[t]he Utah Court of Appeals has cited with 
approval the Peter Fabrics case, and has further described the rule that an indemnitee 
may recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending an indemnified claim as 
stating that the "Seller agrees to indemnify the Buyer . . . and hold each of them harmless 
from and against... in respect of the entirety of any Losses which the Buyer Parties may 
suffer, sustain or become subject to . . . .as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in 
connection with . . . the breach of any representation or warranty made by the Seller in 
Article 3 of this Agreement. . . ." (R. 52-53.) There is no reference to indemnification 
for claimed breaches of warranty. 
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the 'virtually unanimous rule.'" (Br. of Appellant at 20.) However, this assertion is 
problematic for the Icon Parties in two respects. First, both James Constructors and 
Pavoni described the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in "defending an 
indemnified claim." James Constructors, 888 P.2d at 673; Pavoni, 999 P.2d at 599 
(Emphasis added). In the present case, the Icon Parties brought their own declaratory 
judgment action rather than "defending" against a claim by Hoist. Additionally, as noted 
above, the claim in the present case was not an "indemnified claim" because the Asset 
Purchase Agreement did not permit indemnification under these circumstances. Second, 
both James Constructors and Pavoni actually reinforce Wells Fargo's argument that the 
express terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement govern. In James Constructors, the 
Court did not rely on general principles of case law in determining the right to indemnity, 
but rather looked to the express provisions of the agreement, stating "we look to that 
document. . . [which] expressly charges [the indemnitor] with any attorney fees [the 
indemnitee] might incur in enforcing the right of indemnification." Id. at 674 (emphasis 
added). Likewise, in Pavoni, the Court noted that "the indemnity agreement specifically 
refers to attorney fees arising from enforcement of the indemnity agreement," and in fact 
the indemnification clause provided for recovery of attorneys fees incurred "by reason of 
any asserted breach." 999 P.2d at 597. As argued above, in the present case, the express 
terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement did not provide indemnification for a mere claim 
of patent infringement, but rather only for actual infringement. Because James 
Constructors and Pavoni both looked to the express language of the indemnification 
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agreement, they are not helpful to the Icon Parties' position. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE JULY 2003 
CERTIFICATE WAS UNTIMELY. 
A. The July 2003 Certificate Was Untimely. 
In July 2003, some 19 months after the escrow terminated, the Icon Parties 
submitted a second certificate (the July 2003 Certificate). However, the July 2003 
Certificate was untimely and the trial court correctly held that the Icon Parties cannot 
state a claim against Wells Fargo based on that certificate. 
1. The Escrow Terminated in December 2001. 
By its terms, the escrow terminated in December 2001. Paragraph 8 of the 
Indemnity Escrow Agreement states: 
8. Termination. This Agreement shall terminate (a) on the date 
on which there are no funds remaining in the Escrow Fund, or (b) by 
mutual consent signed by all parties. 
(R. 65.) 
No funds remained in the Escrow Fund after December 2001 and thus the escrow 
terminated as of that date. 
7
 The Icon Parties also cite Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) for the proposition that the right to indemnity is not contingent on the 
outcome of the claim. (Br. of Appellant at 21.) However, unlike the present case which 
involves an express agreement regarding indemnity, in Hanover there was no such 
express agreement, but rather indemnification was based on a theory of implied 
indemnity in a products liability case. 758 P.2d at 445 ("[t]here is no express indemnity 
contract between Trans West and Cessna . . . . Consequently, Trans West is entitled to be 
indemnified, if at all, under the equitable concept of implied indemnity."). 
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The Icon Parties argue that Wells Fargo may not rely on the December 2001 
release of funds 1o terminate the escrow because that release was in breach of the terms of 
the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as 
explained above, the August 2001 Certificate, on which the Icon Parties base their 
argument that Wells Fargo's release of the funds was premature, was not a valid claim for 
indemnification. Absent that claim, the Escrow Funds were to be released in December 
2001. The Icon Parties cannot claim benefit from an alleged breach by Wells Fargo when 
that breach relates solely to an invalid claim for indemnification submitted by the Icon 
Parties. Second, by definition, no escrow can exist without funds in escrow. Whether or 
not the agreement so provides, when no funds are held in escrow, the escrow has 
terminated. 
2. There Was No Basis For Holding The Funds After February 2003. 
The clear intent of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement was to preserve the Escrow 
Fund for one year - to December 21, 2001, unless a claim was made. (R. 790-791, 794.) 
The Icon Parties made a claim to the Escrow Fund in August 2001, but that claim was not 
a valid claim for indemnification from the Escrow Fund. (R. 749-752.) The Icon Parties 
now want the Court to say that, because of this invalid claim to Escrow Funds, they 
should be entitled to assert a second claim to the Escrow Fund, more than two and one-
half years after the Escrow Fund was to be released to Ground Zero, absent a valid claim 
(and months after the claim was proved to be invalid by the Judgment in the Declaratory 
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Judgment Action). This argument is contrary to the terms and clear intent of the written 
agreements. 
The February 10, 2003 Order by the United States District Court conclusively 
established that the August 2001 Certificate did not represent a valid claim for 
indemnification. Absent a valid claim for indemnification, the Escrow Funds were to be 
released in December 2001. Thus, as of February 10, 2003, the Icon Parties had no valid 
basis for claiming that Wells Fargo should have been holding any Escrow Funds. 
Therefore, the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and ineffective to make any claim 
under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On the undisputed facts presented to the trial court, no damages can be claimed by the 
Icon Parties due to the release of the Escrowed Funds to Ground Zero because under the 
parties5 agreement, the Icon Parties' claim to the money failed. Accordingly, Wells 
Fargo respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing 
the Icon Parties'claims. 
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